Abstract-To improve the quality of life for patients, Implantable Medical Devices (IMDs) are opening new opportunities for holistic health care monitoring and treatment of various medical conditions. Implanting radio frequency (RF) modules in IMDs proves beneficial in wireless connectivity and facilitated access to on-device data and post-deployment tuning during therapy. However due to this IMDs are susceptible to various security attacks. Different encryptions algorithms have been developed to prevent well known attacks on IMDs. However due to lack of secured key exchange protocol and immaturity of already-in-use wakeup protocols are two fundamental challenges that must be addressed to ensure the security of wireless enabled IMDs. In this research paper, we introduce an optical secure communication channel between an IMD and an external device. This channel enables an intrinsically user-perceptible unidirectional data transmission, suitable for physically-secure communication with minimal size and energy overheads. We designed and implemented two protocols : (i) A low power wakeup protocol and a secure key exchange protocol. We investigated these two protocols using a human body model. Keywords -IMD, OpSecure, cryptography, Acoustic Channel, Key exchange.
3. We propose a secure key exchange protocol, which enables sharing of the encryption key between IMDs and their associated external devices. 4. We discuss the design and implementation of a prototype IMD platform that supports the proposed protocols and present evaluation results for the prototype.
II. WAKE UP AND KEY EXCHANGE PROTOCOL :
The IMD and its associated external device commonly have an RF channel that is used for bidirectional data communication. We assume that both devices are capable of using symmetric encryption for protecting the data sent over the RF channel. The basic system architecture that we target is shown in Fig. 1 .
Fig. 1 : Overall System Architecture
Due to constraint on on-sensor energy, the RF modules must be enabled only when absolutely needed, e.g. when an authorized physician wants to access on-device data. Thus prior to each data transmission, the RF module should be activated using a pre-defined wake-up protocol. This protocol must satisfy two main design requirements. First, it must be sesilient against battery draining attacks so that an attacker cannot activate the RF module. Second, it should add negligible size and energy overheads to the device.
After enabling the RF module by the wakeup protocol, data can be transmitted over the bidirectional communication channel that supports symmetric encryption. As symmetric encryption is based on an encryption key, an exchange protocol must be used to securely exchange the encryption key between the IMD and the external device. Every practical key exchange protocol must guarantee the confidentiality of the encryption key and be resililent to remote eavesdropping and its size and energy overheads must be minimal. It also must ensure that the health care professionals can access and control IMD without a natable delay in an emergency situation in which the patient needs immediate medical assistance.
Wake-up Protocols :
Generally, a magnetic switch is commonly integrated into today's IMDs to turn on the RF module when needed. However magnetic switches are vulnerable to battery draining attacks since they can be remotely activated. The wakeup protocol presented by Halperin et al. relies on an authentication technique in which the IMD harvest the RF energy supplied by the external device itself. The RF module is powered by the battery only after the external device is authenticated. However the RF energy harvesting subsystem needs an antenna which imposes a significant size overhead on the IMD. Kim et al. suggest a wakeup scheme in which the IMD activates the RF module when it detects the vibration generated by an external electric motor. Their scheme adds minimal size and energy overheads to the IMD since it only needs the addition of a low power accelerometer to the IMD. However, in practice, the patient's regular activities e.g. running or fast
1.
Ultraviolet tattoos : Schechter et al. presented a scheme in which a fixed user selected human-readable key is tattooed directly on the patient's body using ultraviolet ink. In this protocol, all devices that need to communicate with the IMD must be equipped with a small, reliable, and inexprensive ultraviolet light-emitting diode and an input mechanism for key entry. This tattoo-based approach has two limitations. First, the design requires the patient to agree to acquire a tattoo, which significantly limits its applicability. Second, if the password becomes compromised, access by the attacker cannot be prevented easily since the password cannot be changes in a user-convenient manner.
2.
Physiological signal-based key generation : A few physiological signal-based key generation protocols have been proposed, which can be used to generate a shared key for the IMD and the external device from synchronized readings of physiological signals, such as an electrocardiogram (ECG). Unfortunately, the robustness and security properties of keys generated using such techniques have not been well established.
3.
Using an acoustic side channel : Halperin et al. presented a key exchange protocol based on acoustic side channels. Unfortunately, their protocol is susceptible to remote acoustic eavesdropping attacks and as a result does not offer a secure key exchange protocol. Moreover, it is not reliable in noisy environments since they utilized a carrier frequency within the audible range. Furthermore, it imposes a significant size overhead.
In this paper, we aim to address the above mentioned shortcomings of previously-proposed protocols, in particular size/energy overheads and vulnearability to eavesdropping, through a simple low-power, yet secure key exchange protocol using visible light.
communication channel, which transmits data from an external device to the IMD, can be implemented with minimal size and energy overheads.
The proposed channel is intrinsically secure due to its close proximity requirement and high user perceptibility. Visible light attenuates fast in the body and hence can only be captured within a very close range. If the light source is in contact with the body and directed at the IMD, it can penetrate deep enough into the body to reach the IMD. However, a passive adversary cannot eavesdrop without an eavesdropping device attached to the body, which is very likely to be noticed by the patient.
As illustrated in Fig 1, the external device may vary from specialized IMD programmers, i.e. external devices that are specifically designed to query the IMD data or send commands to the IMD, to general-purpose portable devices, e.g. smart-phones. As in the case of vibration based keyexchange, we implement our prototype using a Smartphone used as the external device as shown in fig. 2 . This has three advantages. First, the component that we need in the external device for establishing the channel is already present in smartphones. Second, smartphones have become the dominant form of base stations for a large number of medical devices since they are ubiquitous and powerful, and provide various technologies needed for numerous applications. As a result, they can be used as a base station for collecting and processing several types of physiological data. Third, smartphones can easily support highly secure encrypted transmission which detects several potential attacks against IMDs. However, the communication channel can also be implemented on other devices that are used to communicate with the IMD with minimal overheads if they can be equipped with a small light source and an input mechanism for key entry.
IV.
THE PROPOSED PROTOCOLS : Here we describe both the proposed wakeup and key exchange protocols that we have developed based on optical communication channel.
1)
Wakeup Protocol : When the light source is in contact with the human body, visible light can penetrate deep into the body to reach the IMD. However, it attenuates very fast in the body. We exploits this fundamental characteristics of visible light to develop a wakeup protocol that works as follows. The smartphones fully turns on its flashlight and the IMD wakes up periodically to check if a light source is on the body, i.e. it checks if the intensity of the light received by the IMD is about a pre-defined threshold. The presence of an on-body light source that points to the IMD is interpreted as the presence of a trusted external device. and the smartphone flashlight acts as a light source. The proposed wakeup protocol adds minimal size and energy overheads to the device. Unlike a majority of previously-proposed protocols, it also provides immunity against battery draining attacks. In fact, an attacker who wants to wake up the RF module, needs to attach a light source to the patient's body at a location close to the IMD. Such an action can be easily detected by the patient.
2) Key Exchange Protocol : Assuming the IMD and the external device use a bidirectional RF communication protocol that supports symmetric encryption, our protocol can be used to transmit a randomly generated key from the smartphone to the IMD. For each key exchange : 3)
Step-1 : The smartphone first generated a randon key K ε {0,1} N = k1k2…kN of length N, and prepares a key packet as Keypacket = Pre||K||Post, where Pre and Post are two fixed binary sequences that are concatenated with the key to mark the beginning and end of a key packet.
Step-2 : The physician places the smartphone on the patient's body so that its flashlight is directed at the light sensor of the IMD (IMDs commonly have a fixed location and can be easily detected by the physician).
Step-3 : The external devices uses on-off keying (OOK) modulation to transmit Keypacket : the flashlight is turned on(off) for a fixed period of time (Tstep) to transmit bit "1" ("0"). The algorithm first computes Tstep = 1000/R ms, where R is the transmission rate given by the user. Then , it calls the keySegmentation procedure, which divides Keypacket into smaller segments such that each segment only consists of all "1"s or all "0"s. Step-4 : The IMD demodulates the received visible light and recovers Keypacket. Then, it extracts K from Keypacket by removing Pre and Post. Thereafter, it encrypts a fixed pre-defined confirmation message M confirm using K and transmits this message C = ENC(M confirm ,K) to the smartphone.
Step-5 : The Smartphone checks if it can successfully decrypt the received message C using K, i.e. if DEC(C,K) = Mconfirm. If the message can be successfully decrypted, the smartphone knows that the IMD received the key K correctly, and then subsequent RF data transmission are encrypted using key K. In addition to key exchange, the proposed protocol (the first three steps) can be used to transmit data/commands from the Smartphone to the IMD without using the RF module. For example, a predefined stream of bits can be reserved for the shutdown command, i,e, a command that entirely disables the device and sent using this protocol when needed. Note that the IMD cannot provide any feedback via optical communication channel since the channel is unidirectional. However, modern IMD commonly have an embedded beeping component that warn the patient in different scenarios, e.g. when the RF module is activated or when the device's battery level is low. Such a component can be also used to provide feedback when the IMD receives a predefined message over optical communication channel, e.g., the beeping component can generate three beeps when the IMD receives the shutdown command via channel.
V.
PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION The optical communication channel establishes a unidirectional communication channel between the IMD and the external device. We implemented a wireless-enabled IMD prototype based on ATmega168V (a low power microprocessor from Atmel), TEMT6000 (an ambient light sensor from Vishay Semiconductors) and RFD77101 (a Bluetooth Low Energy module from Simblee). The prototype does not offer any health monitoring/therapeutic operations. Indeed, it only implements the two proposed protocols. TEMT6000 enables the optical communication channel by receiving visible light generated by the user's smartphone, and RFD77101 provides the bidirectional RF communication that can be secured using a symmetric encryption mechanism for which the key can be exchanged over the channel. We also developed an Android application that can be used to either wake the IMD up or generate and transmit a randon key to the IMD using the smartphone flashlight. The application allows the user to set the key length (N) and transmission rate (R). Fig.4 shows the application and the prototype. It also demonstrates how the application turns the flashlight on/off to transmit the key. For the key exchange example shown in fig.4 , the transmission rate and key length are set to 20 b/s and 4 b (in practice, the N used would be much higher, e.g. 64b, respectively. Thus, the smartphone needs Tstep = 1000/4 = 50 ms for transmitting a single bit. In this implementation, the application uses two 4-bit sequences ("1100" and "1111") to mark the beginning and end of the key. 
VI. EVALUATION OF PROPOSED PROTOCOL :
We present evaluation results for the prototype implementation. In particular, we evaluate the transmission range (how far the smartphone can be placed from the IMD and have the visible light still reach it), wakeup/exchange time (the time needed by the wakeup/exchange protocol), protocol overheads (size and energy), and their security. Prevents eavesdropping and key injection VII. CONCLUSION In this paper, we described why attack-resilient wakeup and secure key exchange protocols are essential for establishing a secure RF-based communication link between the IMD and the external device. We presented an optical secure communication channel between an IMD and an external device that enables an intrinsically short range, user-perceptible one-way data transmission. Based on the optical secure communication channel, we proposed a wakeup and a key exchange protocol. In order to evaluate the proposed protocols, we implemented an IMD prototype and developed an Android application that can be used to wake up the IMD and transmit the encryption key from the smartphone to the IMD. We evaluated our prototype implementation using a human body model. The experimental results demonstrated that the optical secure communication channel can be used to implement both wakeup and key exchange protocols for IMDs with minimal size and energy overheads.
